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Abstract
In Gathergood et al. (forthcoming), we studied credit card repayments using linked data on multiple cards from the
United Kingdom. We showed that individuals did not allocate payments to the higher interest rate card, which would
minimize the cost of borrowing, but instead made repayments according to a balance-matching heuristic under which
the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. In this paper, we examine
whether these results extend to the United States using a large sample of TransUnion credit bureau data. These data
do not have interest rates, so we cannot examine the optimality of payments. However, we observe balances and
repayments, so we can examine balance-matching behavior. We replicate our analysis and find that Americans also
repay their debt in accordance with a balance-matching heuristic.
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1 Introduction
In Gathergood et al. (2019) we studied competing models of how individuals repay their
debt across their portfolio of credit cards. The key to this analysis was a dataset with rich
information on contract terms and utilization for multiple credit cards held by individuals
in the United Kingdom. Using these data, we showed that individuals did not allocate
payments to the higher interest rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing,
but instead made payments according to a balance-matching heuristic under which the
share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card.1
In this paper, we examine whether these results extend to the United States using a
large sample of TransUnion credit bureau data.2 These data do not have interest rates, so
we cannot examine the optimality of payments, but do include balances and repayments,
so we can examine balance matching and other heuristic models. We are unaware of
any U.S. dataset that has interest rates on multiple cards for a representative sample of
individuals.
We evaluate balance matching and the other heuristics using the same methodology as
Gathergood et al. (2019). As in the U.K., we ﬁnd that balance matching outperforms the
other heuristics in terms of goodness-of-ﬁt (RMSE, MAE, Pearson’s ρ) and also performs
strongly in horse race analysis, where we determine the best ﬁt model on an individual ×
month basis.3 As before, we ﬁnd that balance matching is persistent within individuals
over time, suggesting it results from a stable feature of repayment behavior.
As we discussed in our prior research, balance matching could arise from the salient
placement of balances on credit card statements and the well-documented tendency for
humans (and other species) to engage in “matching behavior”. Balance matching could
also arise from individuals repaying a constant percentage of the balance on each card
in a given month (e.g., 10% on each card this month), a rule-of-thumb that would lead
to inefﬁcient payments on both the allocative and extensive margins. While the precise
underpinnings of balance matching are still an open question, the ﬁnding that balance
matching also occurs in the U.S. indicates that it is a broad phenomenon.
2 Data
Our data is a panel of credit reports over 2000-2016 from TransUnion, a national credit
reporting agency. The panel is based on a 10% random sample of individuals with a
TransUnion report in 2000, with 10% of new entrants to the TransUnion database added to
the panel each month. Our unit of analysis is the individual ×month, which we refer to as
observations. We construct separate samples based on the number of credit cards held by
1The ﬁrst result builds on Ponce, Seira and Zamarripa (2017), who ﬁnd in Mexican data that individuals
carry a large fraction of their balances on their high interest rate card.
2Most Americans have two or more cards. Using 2015 data, we calculate that 71.5% of credit cards holders
had two or more cards, and individuals with two or more cards accounted for 91.8% of balances and 91.7%
of revolving balances.
3A 1/N rule performs better in the U.S. than the U.K. data.
the individual in that month.
Traditionally, credit bureaus provided data on credit card balances and credit limits,
but did not provide data on payments or minimum payments due. However, during
our time period, TransUnion was adding payments and minimum payments variables,
allowing us to study balance matching behavior. We drop observations where payments or
minimum payments data are missing or have not been updated since the previous month,
since they are likely to be out of date. As in our earlier work, we also drop observations
where the individual is delinquent, over their credit limit, or pays less than the minimum
or more than the balance on at least one card.
Following Gathergood et al. (2019), we also implement “economic” sample restrictions
to ensure that the resulting individuals have scope to reallocate their payments, holding
total payments ﬁxed. We drop observations with zero aggregate balances, since individuals
have no balances to repay. We drop observations where the individual pays the minimum
on all of their cards, since they could only reallocate payments by paying less than the
minimum on at least one card, which would trigger a penalty. And we drop observations
where the individual pays all of their cards in full, because any reallocation would result in
the in paying more than the full balance on at least one card. See Gathergood et al. (2019)
for more discussion of these sample restrictions.
Appendix Table AI shows the impact of these sample restrictions on individuals
× months and aggregate balances in the two-card sample. The data coverage related
restrictions, shown in Panel A, account for the majority of the reduction in sample size.
The ﬁnal two-card sample has 713,157 observations and $3.6 billion in balances.
3 Heuristics
With the exception of optimal repayments, we examine the same repayment models
considered in Gathergood et al. (2019). Some of these heuristics are based on the capacity
of a credit card, which we deﬁne as the difference between the credit limit and current
balance. We describe these heuristics for the two-card sample, but they could be naturally
extended to settings with three or more cards.
• Balance Matching: Match the share of repayments on each card to the share of
balances on each card.
• 1/N Rule: Make equal-sized repayments on each card. This is the debt repayment
analogue to the 1/N rule for pension plan contributions (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001).
• Heuristic 1: Repay the card with the lowest capacity, subject to paying the minimum
on each card. Once capacity is equalized across cards, allocate additional payments
to both cards equally. This heuristic reduces the risk that an accidental purchase will
put an individual over their credit limit.
• Heuristic 2: Repay the card with the highest capacity, subject to paying the minimum
on each card. Once the highest capacity card is fully repaid, allocate remaining
payments to the other card. This heuristic maximizes the “space” to make a large
purchase on a single card.
• Heuristic 3: Repay the card with the highest balance, subject to paying the minimum
on each card. Once balances are equalized across cards, allocate additional payments
to both cards equally. This heuristic reduces the maximum balance across cards.
• Heuristic 4: Repay the card with the lowest balance (“debt snowball method”),
subject to paying the minimum on each card. Once the balance on the lowest balance
card is paid down to zero, allocate remaining payments to the other card. The debt
snowball method is recommended by some ﬁnancial advisors because paying off a
card delivers a “win” that motivates further repayment behavior and simpliﬁes an
individual’s debt portfolio.
4 Results
We evaluate balance matching and the other heuristics using the same methodology as
Gathergood et al. (2019). For ease of comparison, we produce tables and ﬁgures with the
same layout as our prior work.
We start by illustrating the distribution of actual and balance matching payments in
the two-card sample. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the marginal distribution of actual and
predicted payments on a randomly chosen card (of the two) under a balance matching
rule. Panel B shows the joint distribution of actual and predicted payments.4 Aside from
the spike at 50%, the marginal distributions are similar. The joint distribution indicates a
strong positive correlation (ρ = 0.61).
Since credit card payments bunch at round numbers, we follow our prior work and
also conduct our analysis separately for observations with round and non-round payments,
where we deﬁne round number payments as multiples of $50. The correlation between
actual and balance-matching payments is higher in the non-round number sample (Figure
1 Panel B) than in the round number sample (Appendix Figure A1). Also, the spike at 50%
is much more pronounced in the round number sample, suggesting that 1/N allocations
might arise due to rounding, a possibility we discuss in more detail in Gathergood et al.
(2019).
Figure 2 shows actual and balance matching payments for the samples with 3-5 cards.
The left column shows themarginal distributions of actual and balance-matching payments
on a randomly chosen card, and the right column shows radar plots with the mean
percentage of repayments allocated to each card ordered clockwise by balance. The plots
indicate that actual payments are close to what is predicted by the balance matching rule.
We formally measure the performance of the balance matching and alternative models
using three standard measures of goodness-of-ﬁt: the square root of the mean square error
4In Gathergood et al. (2019), we showed results for the high APR card. Since we do not observe interest
rates, in this paper we randomly choose one of the two cards to focus on. Because our goodness-of-ﬁt metrics
are invariant to the card which is chosen, this distinction has no bearing on our results.
Figure 1: Balance Matching
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Note: Left panels show the distribution of actual and balance-matching payments on one card. Right
panels show the joint density of actual and balance-matching payments. Panel A shows the baseline
sample two-card sample; Panel B restricts the sample to non-round payment amounts (not multiples of
$50).
Figure 2: Actual and Balance-Matching Payments on Multiple Cards
(A) Three Cards
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(B) Four Cards
0
2
4
6
8
D
en
si
ty
 (
%
)
0 50 100
Payment on One Card (%)
Actual Balance Matching
60
60
60
60
Card 1: Lowest Balance
 Card 2        
Card 3
          Card 4: 
        Highest
        Balance
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
Actual
Balance Matching
(C) Five Cards
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Note: Left column shows the marginal distributions of actual and balance-matching payments on one
card. Right column shows radar plots of the mean percentage of actual payments and payments under
the balance-matching rule allocated to each card. In the radar plots, cards are ordered clockwise from the
highest to the lowest balance (starting at the ﬁrst node clockwise from noon).
Figure 3: Goodness-of-Fit for Different Models
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Note: Goodness-of-ﬁt for different models of the percentage of payments on one card in the baseline
two-card sample.
(RMSE), the mean absolute error (MAE), and the correlation between actual and predicted
payments (Pearson’s ρ).
To help interpret the goodness-of-ﬁt values, we also establish lower and upper bench-
marks. For a lower benchmark, we calculate goodness-of-ﬁt under the assumption that
the percentage of repayments allocated to the card is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution with support on the 0-100% interval.
To provide an upper benchmark, we use machine learning techniques to construct a
set of purely statistical models of repayment behavior. Speciﬁcally, we estimate decision
tree, random forest, and extreme gradient boosting models for the percentage of payments
on the high balance card. We use the same set of variables which enter into our heuristics
(balances and credit limits on both cards) as input variables and “tune” the models to
maximize out-of-sample power.5 Technical details are provided in the Online Appendix
accompanying Gathergood et al. (2019).6
Figure 3 reports the goodness of ﬁt from this analysis. Appendix Table AII shows the
numerical values. The lower benchmark of random repayment has the worst ﬁt. Balance
matching performs close to the upper benchmark, determined by the machine learning
models, as measured by RMSE and MAE, and better than this benchmark, as measured by
Pearson’s ρ.7 Heuristics 1-4 do not perform much better than the lower benchmark. The
1/N rule performs similarly well to the balance matching rule as measured by RMSE and
5In Gathergood et al. (2019) we also included APRs and spending amounts, which are not available in the
TransUnion data.
6Appendix Figure A2 displays the estimated decision tree.
7This result should be interpreted with the caveat that the machine learning models, by design, minimize
RMSE.
MAE, but has zero correlation with actual repayments, by construction.8
To complement the goodness-of-ﬁt analysis, we also evaluate the models using “horse
races” where we determine the best ﬁt model on an observation-by-observation basis.
A model that ﬁts a smaller number of observations very poorly, but a larger number
quite well, would perform poorly under the goodness-of-ﬁt analysis but well under this
approach.
Panel A of Table I compares each model against the lower benchmark of randomly dis-
tributed payments. Balance matching is the best ﬁt model for 67.4% of observations, twice
the percentage of the random benchmark. This is much better than Heuristics 1-4, slightly
better than the 1/N heuristic, and slightly worse than the upper benchmarks provided
by the machine learning models. Panel B compares each model against balance matching,
excluding the comparison with random benchmark shown in Panel A. Balance matching
has the best ﬁt for a substantially higher percentage of observations than Heuristics 1-4,
a slightly lower percentage than 1/N, and a slightly lower percentage than the machine
learning models.
As we discussed in our prior work, it is not surprising that themachine learningmodels
sometimes ﬁt the data better than balance matching. These models use balances as an
input and could, with large enough sample size, replicate the balance-matching heuristic.
The advantage of balance matching is that it is easy to understand, has psychological
underpinnings (e.g., probability matching, Herrnstein’s matching law), and might provide
intuition in yet-to-be-studied environments.
To the extent that we think of the competing models as actually representing different
models of individual decision-making, we would naturally expect the best-ﬁt model to be
persistent within individuals over time. Table II shows the within-person transition matrix
for the best-ﬁt model. The sample is restricted to individual ×months where we observe
repayment behavior for at least two months in a row. For this exercise, we include all of
the candidate models in the horse race, and we ﬁx the uniformly distributed repayment to
be constant within individuals over time. Consistent with Gathergood et al. (2019), balance
matching and 1/N exhibit high degrees of persistence, suggesting they result from a stable
feature of repayment behavior.9
8Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table AIII show goodness-of-ﬁt separately for the round and
non-round number samples. The results are similar.
9Among individuals whose repayments are best ﬁt by the uniform model in a given month, 33% make
repayments that are closest to the uniform model in the next month. This persistence likely reﬂects the fact
that balances and repayments are sticky over time: If the uniform model happens to be accurate in a given
month, and balances and payments are sticky, then the uniform model, which is ﬁxed to be constant within
an individual over time, will mechanically be accurate in the next month as well.
Table I: Horse Races Between Alternative Models
Panel (A): Random vs. Other Rules
Horse Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Win Percent
Random 32.63 34.47 49.32 46.04 48.08 47.29 30.95 29.59 29.22
Balance Matching 67.37
1/N 65.53
Heuristic 1 50.68
Heuristic 2 53.96
Heuristic 3 51.92
Heuristic 4 52.71
Decision Tree 69.05
Random Forest 70.41
XGBoost 70.78
Panel (B): Balance Matching vs. Other Rules
Horse Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Win Percent
Balance Matching 49.03 59.81 57.25 61.23 55.82 49.76 47.15 46.06
1/N 50.97
Heuristic 1 40.19
Heuristic 2 42.75
Heuristic 3 38.77
Heuristic 4 44.18
Decision Tree 50.24
Random Forest 52.85
XGBoost 53.94
Note: Table shows percentage of individual ×month observations that are best ﬁt by different models of
repayment behavior using the baseline two-card sample.
Table II: Transition Matrix for Best-Fit Model
Current Period
Balance
Random Matching H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 1/N
Previous Period
Random 32.70% 17.98% 5.74% 6.93% 7.31% 6.50% 22.84%
Balance Matching 7.74% 44.48% 5.84% 6.96% 7.84% 5.05% 22.09%
Heuristic 1 (Pay Down Lowest Capacity) 5.86 % 12.98% 24.12% 9.90% 15.16% 17.54% 14.44%
Heuristic 2 (Pay Down Highest Capacity) 5.64 % 11.76% 8.71% 25.97% 17.97% 16.83% 13.13%
Heuristic 3 (Pay Down Highest Balance) 5.64% 13.68% 14.65% 18.24% 26.37% 7.81% 13.60%
Heuristic 4 (Pay Down Lowest Balance) 5.04% 10.11% 15.76% 18.64% 8.96% 25.65% 15.84%
1/N 7.39% 16.14% 5.40% 5.78% 5.52% 6.15% 53.63%
Note: Table shows transition matrix for the best-ﬁt payment model using the baseline two-card sample.
5 Conclusion
In Gathergood et al. (2019), we examined linked data on multiple credit cards from the
United Kingdom. We showed that individuals did not allocate payments to the higher
interest rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing, but instead made repay-
ments according to a balance-matching heuristic under which the share of repayments on
each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. In this paper, we replicated our
analysis using a large sample of TransUnion credit bureau data, and found that Americans
also make payments in accordance with a balance-matching heuristic, indicating that it is
a broad phenomenon.
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